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The House of Habsburg was arguably one of Europe’s most powerful royal houses throughout 
the later medieval period and nearly all of the early modern period. But it became increasingly 
obvious in the nineteenth century that the monarchy was fading away and had no place in the 
new world of European politics. However, determining the exact point at which the Habsburgs 
began their decline is problematic. There were several difficulties faced by the Habsburg 
monarchy in the second half of the nineteenth century and the years leading up to the First World 
War. Due to the nature of alliances among the European powers during the long nineteenth 
century, political manoeuvring was such that even the slightest miscalculation had the potential 
to produce catastrophic consequences. Additionally, the nineteenth century was a century in 
which nationalism took hold in much of Europe, primarily among the numerous ethnic groups in 
the Habsburg Monarchy. The fact that Franz Ferdinand, Crown Prince to the Austro-Hungarian 
throne, was assassinated did not in itself set off the First World War or the fall of the Habsburg 
Monarchy; these events were the result of reactions to a very complex situation. This essay will 
argue that the fundamental causes of the collapse of the House of Habsburg were Balkan 
nationalism, a decline in their relationship with Russia which pushed Austria-Hungary into a war 
that the Habsburgs lost and could not recover from, and most importantly, an alliance with 
Germany which none of the other European powers were willing to tolerate. 
 
As early as 1866 Austrian Emperor Franz Joseph could see that the future was grim for 
the House of Habsburg, as is evident in a letter written to his mother in which he stated that the 
best possible outcome for him would be to “resist as long as possible” and to “perish with 
honour.”1 The emperor presented further knowledge of the strong possibility he anticipated of 
the end of the empire when he, in his will, strongly advised his daughter that it would be in her 
best interest to live in Germany and not in Vienna.
2
 Due to the extensive history of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire, its extent and the numerous ethnicities incorporated, the thought of the 
empire collapsing must have brought to mind a number of disastrous possibilities. 
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As Alan Sked points out, in the nineteenth century when the Habsburgs ruled over the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire and not the Holy Roman Empire, their possessions were still 
remarkable as they included 37.5 million people and a landmass of 257,478 mi
2
.
3
 Yet, as 
previously mentioned, as early as 1866 Emperor Franz Joseph saw signs that the empire was in 
decline. In order for an Empire with a dynasty so storied and a landmass that constituted a 
considerable portion of mainland Europe to be in decline, events of drastic proportion must have 
occurred. As Robert Kann affirms, the years 1848–1918 were years in which monarchical 
government came into competition with the principles of constitutional government.
4
 Therefore, 
even if the collapse of the dynasty was largely due to losing the First World War, the Habsburgs 
had faced other considerable conflicts and tension in their last half century as a European ruling 
house. 
 
The Habsburg lands were not immune from the liberal ideas that were prevalent in 
nineteenth century Europe and due to the fact that the Habsburgs ruled over a vast number of 
ethnic groups they were not immune from nationalist aspirations either. The way that the 
Habsburg Monarchy dealt with these ideas was simply to repress them.
5
 This was perhaps not the 
best plan; however, there was still a chance and a hope by those that held hereditary positions of 
power that suppression of anything liberal and challenging to the pre-French Revolution status 
quo could work. As John Merriman points out, when Habsburg Emperor Franz Joseph came to 
the Austrian throne in the aftermath of the revolutions of 1848 and the inability of his 
predecessor to correctly deal with these problems, the monarchy entered a period of “neo-
absolutism.”6 There is much speculation by historians on how much of a role the events related 
to the revolutionary era of 1848 played in the downfall of the Habsburg monarchy. However it is 
possible to argue that the events that took place at the Congress of Berlin, in which, Bosnia-
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Herzegovina became part of the Habsburg political agenda—which put them at odds with the 
Russian Empire—were the start of a chain reaction that would lead to war in 1914.7 
 
In addition to the nationalist political turmoil and political climate prevalent in the 
Balkans at the end of the nineteenth century, its geographic location made it a vital point of 
interest in the politics of the great European powers. As Vladimir Dedijer pointed out, the 
Balkans served as a linking point between Europe, Asia and Africa making it an area where the 
great powers clashed.
8
 This issue became relevant at the Congress of Berlin, convened by Otto 
von Bismarck, to discuss the disagreement over control of Bulgaria in June 1878.
9
 The end result 
of the Congress of Berlin gave Austria the right to occupy and fully administer Bosnia-
Herzegovina for an undetermined amount of time, which, as Robert Kann notes, put a strain on 
Austro-Russian relations and led to a greater Austrian dependency on German protection.
10
 
Although there were economic ramifications involved, this issue could not ignore the fact that 
nationality played a role in the aggressions as the South Slavs were Slavs, as were the Russians.
11
 
Therefore, both economic and nationalist rivalries combined to produce tension as Austria-
Hungary under the Habsburgs moved into territory coveted by Russia. 
 
The last few years of the nineteenth century saw significant strains on the alliance 
system.
12
 In the year 1903, Alexander I of the House of Obrenovich, the pro-Habsburg and 
corrupt King of Serbia, was murdered and replaced by the pro-Russian house of Karadjordjevic. 
This was bad for the Habsburgs because not only did this change the balance of power in Europe, 
but from this point onward both Serbian national feelings and foreign policy became openly 
hostile to the Habsburg Monarchy.
 13
 Austria’s actions would further upset the political situation 
in Europe when Austria made a political move that agitated both Russia and the Serbian 
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population. In 1908 a group in Turkey called the Young Turks took power in Constantinople and 
forced the Sultan to convene a Parliament, in which Bosnia-Herzegovina would have 
representation.
14
 As Kann notes, Austrian Foreign Minister Baron von Aerenthal used the 
situation in Turkey as grounds for moving from occupation to annexation in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
even though his primary concern was the Southern Slavs.
15
 
 
In particular, Baron von Aerenthal was concerned about Serbs spreading propaganda for 
the cause of creating a Yugoslav state out of the Slav territories in the Balkans. The annexation 
caused many of the Southern Slavs, particularly Serbs, to become even more angered with 
Austria-Hungary and anti-Austrian propaganda which had diplomatic support from Russia 
increased.
16
 Thus Austria-Hungary’s annexation of the territory angered the European powers, 
including Germany, as this was a violation of the Treaty of Berlin; Austria-Hungary was only 
supposed to occupy Bosnia-Herzegovina.
17
 At this point, the Russians, who did not desire war, 
agreed to abandon all support of Serbia and in return Austria was to give assurance that they 
would not attack Serbia.
18
 After being humiliated by Austria and not being in any position to 
respond, Russia must have been infuriated by the annexation. Unfortunately for all parties 
involved, this issue would become more of a future issue of contention. In fact, as L.C.B. 
Seaman indicated, the Balkans, like Alsace-Lorraine, had the potential to make any diplomatic 
solution impossible.
19
 As later events unfolded, this proved correct. 
 
It is important to point out that after the violation of the Treaty of Berlin with the 
annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, both France and Britain saw Austria as an aggressor. France 
was even on unofficial friendly terms with the Slavic population within the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire.
20
 Austrian politicians undoubtedly would have viewed this with reservation, had they 
known about the secret relationship and the thoughts of Great Britain and France. One may 
wonder if the Austrians felt as Bismarck once did- surrounded by hostile nations. 
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At this time nationalism was gaining even greater momentum in the Balkans and one 
group in particular would make their appearance on the world stage: the Black Hand.
21
 The 
assassination of the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand did not cause too many people to grieve 
on a personal level, as, according to Dedijer, “few men have had so many enemies, within their 
own countries and abroad, as the Heir Apparent to the Habsburg throne, Archduke Franz 
Ferdinand.”22 Indeed, this is not seen by most historians to be the root cause of the First World 
War. The reason Austria took action was because the Austrian government believed that Gavrilo 
Princip, the student who had assassinated Franz Ferdinand was an agent of Belgrade, thus giving 
Austria the perfect excuse to solve the Serbian nationalist problem once and for all.
23
 
 
In order to fully understand the chain of events that occurred once an ultimatum was 
made to Serbia and war was declared, attention must be brought to the alliance system and in 
particular the Dual Monarchy’s alliance with Germany. Germany under Bismarck was 
determined not to go to war with Russia, evidenced by Bismarck’s initiation of the Three 
Emperor’s league in 1873 and again in 1881.24 However, when Kaiser Wilhelm II came to power 
and dismissed Bismarck, Germany’s position towards Russia was modified and the Reinsurance 
Treaty was not renewed.
25
 
 
Although the treaty was not renewed, Germany did not show signs that they were too 
eager for war. In fact, Kaiser Wilhelm II wrote a letter to Archduke Franz Ferdinand, cautioning 
him against getting too heavily involved in the Balkans, stating that Panslavism was a danger to 
the Habsburg Monarchy.
26
 However, these letters were written in 1908 and 1909.
27
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Soon after, Germany showed an increased interest in the Balkans as pertaining to 
Austria’s involvement there.28 After the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, Wilhelm II urged 
Austria to react stating, that he was willing to fight a “world war” for the sake of Austria’s 
prestige and that the Slavs were “born to serve.”29 Once assured of German support, Vienna 
began to execute their plans, first issuing an ultimatum to Serbia and then in declaring war.
30
 
 
Interestingly, when preparing for war with Serbia - which was seen as only a possibility 
albeit a very strong one before war was actually declared - only Emperor Franz Joseph and one 
of his advisors, Hungarian Prime Minister, Count Istvan Tiza, were not wholeheartedly wishing 
for military retaliation towards Serbia as an immediate action.
31
 The emperor simply felt that the 
time for war was not “ripe.”32 Count Tiza feared that declaring war on Serbia would bring about 
Russian intervention and therefore a world war.
33
 As Macartney pointed out, all of the powers 
should have seen that the system of European alliances was constructed in a manner which made 
a localized war impossible.
34
 On the 28 July, 1914 when Austria declared war on Serbia, Count 
Tiza’s prediction would prove correct less than a month later as all the major powers declared 
war on each other.
35
 
 
The war that ensued was undoubtedly a terrible war for all parties involved. As Seaman 
noted, the war in itself was not an anti-Habsburg war until Italy—once an ally of Austria-
Hungary—entered the conflict, and the dismemberment of the Habsburg Empire became a war 
aim once Romania joined in the fight.
36
 This fact was in perfect keeping with anti-Habsburg 
sentiments, as both countries entered the war due to nationalist interests.
37
 The House of 
Habsburg’s control over the lands within their empire started to cave during the final years of the 
war. Emperor Franz Joseph passed away on 21 November, 1916 after sixty-eight years on the 
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throne, succeeded by his great-nephew, Emperor Karl I.
38
 After such a long reign entailing much 
political and personal tragedy, it seems fitting that Franz Joseph be spared the sight of the end of 
the House of Habsburg as a ruling power in Europe. Convinced advocates of revolutionary 
change had, for the most part, put on hold their plans for national and social change as it seemed 
very probable at the time that after the death of Franz Joseph the aspirations of different national 
groups would both gain momentum and be supported by Karl I who did not wish to rule with an 
iron hand.
39
 The next two years would see nationalities within the empire expressing nationalist 
incentives and the war effort significantly deteriorating. 
 
The different factors in which the Habsburg Monarchy came to an end lead to differing 
opinions among historians in regards to the question of whether or not the downfall of the House 
of Habsburg was an internal or external collapse. Robert A. Kann believes that the breakdown 
came from within the monarchy while Alan Sked asserts that the monarchy fell because it lost a 
major war.
40
 Z. A. B. Zeman recognized that there were many factors that brought an end to the 
Habsburgs of which radical nationalism was the most disruptive.
41
 Zeman explains that after the 
outbreak of the First World War, radicals inside the monarchy became increasingly dependent on 
support from the Entente Powers.
42
 The Entente powers fighting against the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire were also fighting Germany, and were not especially keen on seeing Germany remain a 
military power. Emperor Karl I, who did not possess the political intellect of his predecessor was 
seeking peace and did so behind the back of Germany, going so far as to promise French Prime 
Minister Georges Clemenceau support for the French claim to Alsace and Lorraine.
43
 The 
importance of this in the downfall of the Habsburg’s is vital because as a repercussion Karl I had 
to beg for German forgiveness, which he received only after promising that the Habsburg 
Monarchy would become a German satellite - thereby increasing Germany’s power base.44 As 
Seaman points out, having a German power block that stretched from the Baltic to the Balkans 
was the last thing that any of the Entente powers wanted to see.
45
 
                                                 
38
 Macartney, Empire, 820. 
39
 Ibid. 
40
 Kann, History, 519. Sked, Decline, 264. 
41
 Zeman, Break Up, xiv–xv. 
42
 Ibid. 
43
 Macartney, Empire, 829. 
44
 Ibid. 
45
 Seaman, Vienna, 200. 
8 
 
 
After eight hundred years of rule, a very long and turbulent nineteenth century and a 
devastating World War, the Habsburg Empire came to an end when Karl I abdicated on 11 
November, 1918.
46
 The Empire had taken part in a two-fold conflict. On the one hand it had 
battled with the nationalist aspirations of various groups, in particular the South Slavs of the 
Balkans which brought it into its second conflict - with Russia. The fact that the Serbs tried so 
hard to gain an independent state gives weight to the notion that the Habsburgs fell from the 
inside. Conversely, the conflict fought with Russia and the Entente powers that won the war 
validates the notion that the Habsburgs fell because they were on the losing side of a war, leading 
one to the conclusion that the reason the monarchy fell from power was not one or the other, but 
both. The third major reason that the Habsburgs fell from power was not connected with Serbia, 
Russia or any of the peoples it ruled over, but its alliance with Germany. Since Karl I had 
betrayed Germany by going behind their back to make agreements with France, he had to agree 
that the Monarchy would be a satellite for Germany which would have increased German power. 
Since France hated and feared German military might and they happened to be on the side that 
won the war, this would have proved impossible. Therefore the Habsburg Monarchy fell because 
of nationalistic tendencies in and out of their control and because of the alliance system pulling 
Russia into the war that they had declared on Serbia. 
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